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that, for the purposes of insurance The exposure, in his opinion, is the
claims involving asbestos, "bodily direct cause of the diseases and, thereinjury" occurs when asbestos fibers fore, inhalation constitutes the point
are inhaled and retained in the lungs, of" bodily injury." Mitchell, 595
even if no diagnosable disease has A.2d at 471.
manifested itself. If the period of
Maryland Casualty disagreed with
coverage has expired under a general Mitchell. It believed that because
liability insurance policy for an in- Mitchell's policy coverage had lapsed,
staller of asbestos products, claims for all asbestos-related disease claims
diseases which are caused by exposure against Mitchell were no longer covto asbestos fibers during the policy ered by Maryland Casualty. It felt that
coverage will be defended by the in- unless the disease has manifested itself
demnifier as if the resulting disease during the policy coverage, there was
had manifested itself during the period no obligation to defend or indemnify.
of coverage.
In support, Maryland Casualty introUntil 1976, Lloyd E. Mitchell was duced the affidavit of Dr. Paul Epstein,
involved in the sale, distribution and a clinician, which stated that exposure
installation of products which con- to asbestos does not always result in
tained asbestos. During the period of disease and that several events must
1965 to at least January 1, 1977, occur in conjunction with asbestos
Mitchell was covered by a general exposure before it can progress to
liability insurance policy from Mary- bodily injury. Therefore, in his opinland Casualty Company.· The policy ion, diagnOSis of the disease would be
required that Maryland Casualty de- the proper point at which to measure
fend and indemnify Mitchell from all " bodily injury." ld.
claims resulting from asbestos-related
Both parties filed for declaratory
bodily injuries which occurred during judgment in the Circuit Court for
the insurance policy period. The HarfordCounty. Afterthecomplaints
policy defined" occurrence" as "an were filed, each party also moved for
accident, including continuous or re- summary judgment claiming that no
peated exposure to conditions, which material facts were in dispute. The
results in bodily injury . . . neither trial court ruled in favor of Maryland
expected nor intended from the stand- Casualty's motion, finding that the
point of the insured." The policy point of" bodily injury," for the puradditionally defined "bodily injury" poses of insurance coverage, should
as " bodily injury, sickness, or disease be measured by the point of manifessustained by any person which occurs tation of the asbestos-related disease.
during the policy period."
Mitchell appealed, and the Court of
After his insurance coverage had Appeals of Maryland granted certiolapsed, Mitchell was sued by several rari before consideration by the court
individuals who had been exposed to of special appeals.
asbestos in his products. He sought to
The appellate court considered two
Mitchell v. Maryland Casualty Co.: have Maryland Casualty defend against issues. The first issue was whether,
FOR THE PURPOSES OF ASBES- the claims, arguing that, because the under a comprehensive generalliabilTOS-RELATED DISEASES UN- people were injured from products ity insurance policy, coverage is trigDER A GENERAL LIABILITY IN- installed during the period of cover- geredatthepointofinitial exposure or
SURANCE POLICY, "BODILY age, he should be defended and indem- when an asbestos-related disease first
INJURY" OCCURS WHEN THE nified from those claims. In support manifests itself to a clinically detectVICTIM IS INITIALLY EXPOSED of this contention, Mitchell introduced able degree. Second, the court conTO THE HAZARDOUS CONDI- the affidavit of Dr. John Craighead, a sidered whether the circuit court erred
TION.
physician and pathologist. It stated in adopting the " manifestation" theory
In Mitchell v. Maryland Casualty that asbestos fibers injure the lungs infmdingforMarylandCasualtywhen,
Co., 595 A.2d 469 (Md. 1991), the upon inhalation, and the resulting in- pathologically, damage to the body
Court of Appeals of Maryland held jury leads to a variety oflung diseases. from asbestos could occur upon expoof the forgery. ld. The court held that
the evidence of both the forged signature on the agreement and Optic's
awareness of the forgery on March 13,
1990, may have carried the requisite
weight for the trial court to find that
Optic continued the suit in bad faith.
The court remanded the case with the
view that the fees and expenses from
the misappropriation claim may be
severable from those associated with
the breach of contract claim, depending on what the trial court finds on
remand. ld. at 590.
The decision of the court of special appeals in Optic Graphics offers
the Maryland legal community some
insight as to the direction lower courts
may take in deciding disputes under
the Maryland Uniform Trade Secret
Act. While courts must regard the
Restatement of Torts as a guide in
defining terms within the Act, they
shall look specifically to the Act for
settling such disputes. Furthermore,
the Maryland legal community can
expect courts to look to general provisions under Maryland Rules ofProcedure and Maryland case law when
sanctioning parties who bring bad
faith trade secret misappropriation
claims under the Maryland Uniform
Trade Secret Act. As for the ambitious employees who decide to branch
off on their own from the powerful,
more established employer, the court
of special appeals has interpreted the
Act to fully protect those daring souls
and their former employers who act in
good faith.
- Michael E. Muldowney
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sure. Id. at 472.
Chief Judge Murphy wrote the
opinion for the court of appeals. In
deciding the first issue, the court first
gathered a working background in the
plain meaning of the term "bodily
injury" as written in the policy description. It acknowledged that without a finding of" bodily injury," coverage would not be triggered. The
court found that" [w]hile the definition of bodily injury includes sickness
and disease . . . the definition also
specifically includes injury to the body
.... " Mitchell, 595 A.2d at 475-76
(quoting Insurance Co. of N. Am. v.
Forty-Eight Insulations, 451 F .Supp.
1230, 1242 (E.D. Mich. 1978), aff'd,
633 F.2d 1212 (6th Cir. 1980) (emphasis in original». The court also
found authority that most jurisdictions
have defined "bodily injury" to include any " localized abnormal condition." Mitchell, 595 A.2d at 476. The
court also looked to Black's Law Dictionary 159 (5th ed. 1979), which
stated that "bodily injury . . .
[g]enerally refers only to injury to the
body, or to ... diseases contracted by
the injured as a result of injury." Id.
These findings illustrated that because
a distinction existed between the occurrence of " bodily injury" and the
resulting manifestation of sickness or
disease, the terminology" sickness or
disease" did not determine when an
injury took place, but only that some
injury did exist. Id. The question of
"when" was an issue for medical
experts.
Consequently, the court of appeals next looked to the affidavits of
the medical experts, Craighead and
Epstein. Id. The court noted that they
were in general agreement as to their
findings, except as to the initial incidence of "bodily injury." Id. The
court took an interest in the particular
field of each expert, just as the Supreme Court of Illinois did in Zurich
Ins. Co. v. Raymark Indus., 514
N.E.2d 150 (Ill. 1987).
The court recognized that the issue presented in Zurich was identical
20 - The Law Forum/22.2

to the one presented before the court in
Mitchell. Mitchell, 595 A.2d at 476.
Nine physicians testified extensively,
and there was disagreement between
the pathologists and the clinicians as
to when an injury occurred in asbestos
cases. The clinicians conceded that
damage might occur upon inhalation,
but they also noted that the lung is
capable of repairing itself so that not
every inhalation precipitates disease.
Id. at 477 (citing Zurich, 514 N.E.2d
at 156). Without symptoms, they
argued, it would be impossible to
determine with accuracy exactly when
a disease began. Therefore, it should
follow that a disease would have to be
diagnosed by its symptoms before it
could constitute a " bodily injury." Id.
This argument, however, did not sway
the Illinois court which concluded that
once asbestos fibers are inhaled, bodily
injury occurs, and nothing within the
insurance policy requires diagnosis
nor does it require identification of
that injury within the policy period.
Simply stated, only the injury must
take place within the policy coverage,
not the subsequently-manifested disease. Id.
Extending this analysis, the Maryland Court of Appeals noted that mere
exposure to asbestos without injury
does not trigger coverage. Id. at 478.
However, upon the diagnosis of a
disease, the courts will look back to
the time of initial exposure to determine when the bodily injury occurred.
Id.
In this writer's opinion, an interesting situation would have arisen if a
person had been diagnosed under the
insured's valid policy. When looking
retroactively to the point of bodily
injury, however, the initial inhalation
of asbestos predated the policy coverage. It is unclear whether coverage
would be allowed even if the insured
product clearly aggravated an otherwise pre-existing asbestos-related mild
lung condition. Technically, no injury actually" occurred" as defined by
the Maryland Casualty policy. Also,
if the process to develop lung disease

from asbestos is not immediate, it
would appear to be very difficult, if
not impossible, to decipher which
inhalation precipitated the disease, i.e.,
was it the asbestos in his own home, a
neighbors home, at work, etc. It would
seem that unless actual initial causation could be shown, coverage would
not be triggered.
The significance of Mitchell v.
Maryland Casualty Co. rests with its
possible application to other disease
related cases where exposure to a
condition is relevant, such as AIDS or
Hepatitis B in hospitals and other
facilities dealing with blood. For
now, Maryland's stance on asbestosrelated insurance coverage is to be
determined from the moment of initial
exposure, so long as a disease manifests itself as a result. This is a policy
which protects both consumers and
installers from unknown dangers which
we may not yet have the technology to
detect. It places the burden temporarily upon insurance companies who
can best afford the risk of using new
materials and devices, and in turn,
through their own influence, can pressure the manufacturers to work harder
to safeguard the public.

- Kenneth Goldsmith
Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.:
FIRST AMENDMENT DOES
NOT PROIDBIT AN INFORMANT FROM RECOVERING
DAMAGES UNDER STATE'S
PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL LAW
FOR NEWSPAPER'S BREACH
OF PROMISE OF CONFIDENTIALITY.
In Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.,
111 S. Ct. 2513 (1991), the United
States Supreme Court held that the
First Amendment does not prohibit an
informant from recovering damages
under a state's generally applicable
promissory estoppel law for a
newspaper's breach of a promise of
confidentiality given in exchange for
information. The Court based its
decision on the theory that laws of

